Despite questions about validity and reliability, the use of value-added estimation methods has moved beyond academic research into state accountability systems for teachers, schools, and teacher preparation programs (TPPs). Prior studies of value-added measurement for TPPs test the validity of researcher-designed models and find that measuring differences across programs is difficult. This study is the first to examine the reliability and usefulness of a value-added model for TPPs developed through a collaborative stakeholder process and mandated by state law for use in accountability. Based on the experience of developing a test-based metric for Texas TPPs, our results suggest that although value-added results are highly correlated across specifications, accountability status for individual programs is very sensitive to decisions about accountability criteria, the selection of teachers, and the selection of control variables.
INTRODUCTION
Despite lingering questions about reliability and validity, value-added estimation methods are quickly moving from academic research settings to practical education settings, where they are being used as accountability measures for schools and teachers (Harris, 2011) . New policies promote the use of value-added models (VAMs) to measure the effectiveness of teacher preparation programs (TPPs) through their effects on the performance of students of program graduates. The US Department of Education has proposed that states use value-added measures in external assessments of training programs, and Race to the Top (RttT) requires that TPP quality be measured with student outcomes (Crowe, 2011) . The Council for Accreditation of Educator Preparation (CAEP) has proposed new requirements for accredited programs to use value-added measures in internal assessments (CAEP, 2010) . Louisiana, Florida, Tennessee, and North Carolina have already published the results of state-mandated assessments of individual TPPs based on performance of students of graduates (Gansle, Noell, Knox, & Schafer, 2010; Henry, Thompson, Fortner, Zulli, & Kershaw, 2010; Henry, Kershaw, Zulli, &Smith, 2012; Noell & Burns, 2006 Noell, Porter, & Patt, 2007; Tennessee State Board of Education, 2009 , 2010 .
Value-added measures of TPP effectiveness are the product of an extensive statistical modeling process that requires many analytic choices (Henry et al., 2012) . For obvious reasons, the published results of statewide analyses cited above include only one set of estimates with each state's model based on a unique set of choices made by researchers or policymakers.
Academic research on value-added estimation suggests that decisions regarding selection, estimation, and interpretation can influence results (Koedel, Parsons, Podgursky, & Ehlert, 2012; Mihaly, McCaffrey, Sass, & Lockwood, 2013; Guarino, Reckase, & Wooldridge, 2012; Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; Harris, 2011; Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013; Schochet & Chiang, 2004; Armour-Garb, 2009; Rothstein, 2009) . When VAMs are a component of accountability, it is important if choices made in the research or policy process influence outcomes for individual TPPs in terms of public perception of program quality or consequences for state accreditation.
A second issue with the transition of VAMs from research to accountability is the importance of stakeholder input in the political process to develop an accountability system. Despite enthusiasm among policymakers, it is unclear if a VAM designed in a laboratory or academic setting will be acceptable in a policy setting.
2 Because VAMs are highly technical, stakeholders without a background in statistics may find them difficult to comprehend.
However, a credible and legitimate accountability system must include stakeholder input and provide results that are useful to consumers and programs (Pleckie, Elfers, & Nakamura, 2012) .
Advocates of test-based accountability argue that results should be clearly communicated to facilitate program improvements (Crowe, 2010) . Although researchers are concerned with issues such as clean data and theoretically sound estimation, stakeholders are concerned about the practical consequences of publishing results.
This paper seeks to clarify the implications of using VAMs in TPP accountability by comparing results based on different estimation choices. Our data and research questions are derived from the process of developing a pilot accountability measure of TPP effectiveness in
Texas. Importantly, the choices we test were identified through a stakeholder participation process where representatives voiced concerns about how programs in Texas would be held accountable for the performance of students of graduates. Comparing VAM results across different modeling choices provides an assessment of whether stakeholder preferences can influence accountability classification for individual programs, effectively stacking the deck for or against certain types of programs. We address two research questions:
Question 1: Are estimates of TPP value added statistically reliable across data selection and estimation choices that matter to stakeholders? Specifically, do results change for individual programs if we include different samples of teachers or different control variables?
Question 2: Are interpretations of value-added results for accountability sensitive to the choices of stakeholders? That is, are the same programs identified as having positive and negative effects on student performance if we modify the strategy for estimation and classification?
We find that VAM scores are highly statistically reliable across several choices of data selection and estimations. These results would reassure researchers that estimates are robust to the tested choices. However, when we apply different strategies to translate VAMs into accountability classifications, results for individual TPPs are highly sensitive to both the selection of criteria for assigning accountability status and choices concerning sample selection and estimation.
This study presents important new evidence on the use of value-added measures in a state accountability system. Specifically this study is the first to present central issues of concern for TPP stakeholders. We find that stakeholders are concerned with fairness in both how VAMs are calculated and how results are interpreted and shared with the public. Second, this study is the first to illustrate how decisions in value-added modeling can influence quality determinations in an accountability system.
REVIEW OF RESEARCH
In theory, linking TPP accountability to student performance will increase the quality of teacher training by holding programs responsible for the performance of their graduates in the classroom (Crowe, 2010) . Advocates argue for new state accountability measures based on student test scores and public disclosure of results to spur improvements in program quality (Crowe, 2010; Greenberg, McKee, & Walsh, 2013) . New state laws and federal recommendations calling for test-based measures of TPPs have proceeded despite a lack of consensus among experts regarding the validity of value-added measures for teachers (Harris, 2011; Rothstein, 2009; Schochet & Chiang, 2004; Amour-Garb, 2009; Rothstein, 2009; Guarino, Reckase, & Wooldridge, 2012; Baker et al., 2010) .
There are two types of research specific to measurement of TPP effects: a growing economic literature that tests the capacity of value-added models to measure differences in TPP effects (Koedel, Parsons, Podgursky, & Ehlert, 2012; Mihaly et al., 2012; Goldhaber & Liddle, 2012) , and a policy-oriented teacher education literature that documents and reports state programs that measure differences in TPP effects (Gansle, Noell, Knox, & Schafer, 2010; Henry, Thompson, Fortner, Zulli, & Kershaw, 2010; Henry et al., 2011; Noell & Burns, 2006 Noell, Porter, & Patt, 2007; Tennessee State Board of Education, 2009 , 2010 . The former focuses on developing and testing the validity of different theoretical models in a laboratory setting using convenient data, whereas the latter focuses on providing accurate public information on TPP quality and consequences for TPP accreditation. Economic studies in a research setting often generate multiple results based on different modeling choices, and typically find that results are sensitive to choices regarding complex empirical issues such as how researchers address the clustering of TPP effects within teachers (Koedel, Parsons, Podgursky, & Ehlert, 2012) and how teachers are assigned to schools based on where they received their training (Mihaly et al, 2012) . Importantly, many academic studies of TPP effects question whether measurable differences in TPP effects exist at all (Koedel et al., 2012; Mihaly et al, 2012; Goldhaber & Liddle, 2012; Osborne, Von Hippel, Lincove, & Mills, 2013) . Studies in a policy setting begin with the assumption that TPP effects exist and can be measured and focus on describing and defending a single set of choices believed to be the best fit to a state's data and policy objectives (Noelle, 2006; Henry et al, 2012) .
Policymakers often overlook the challenges of estimating differences in TPP effects on student achievement. Henry et al. (2012) present three categories of challenges, each requiring numerous decisions by researchers. The first is selection, which involves decisions regarding which students and teachers are included in the estimation. The second is estimation, which involves decisions about the empirical model for the VAM. The third challenge, interpretation of results, is where political decisions can have the greatest influence. VAM models produce a continuous distribution of scores around a reference value that must be selected by researchers (Noell & Burns, 2006) . Advocates of state accountability promote systems that provide clear identification of TPP quality based on VAMS. Crowe (2010) calls for state accountability based on, "a set of clear signals about program quality that policymakers can understand." As an example, the National Center for Teacher Quality (NCTQ) rates TPPs based on meeting specific standards by assigning each program zero to four stars (Greenberg, McKee, & Walsh, 2013) . To apply this type of tiered rating system to value-added results would require subjective decisions about the definitions and cut-offs for each tier. Inevitably, individual TPPs will fall near these cut-offs. We found no prior research that tests the implications of setting different criteria for the interpretation of VAM results for accountability.
As a group, the economic studies bring into question the capacity of value-added models to accurately measure the effects of TPPs on student performance and the sensitivity of VAMs to researcher choices. It is our objective to fill a gap in the literature on TPP effectiveness by applying the empirical methods of academic studies to a context of state accountability. This study contributes to our understanding of the practical use of VAMs for TPPs by estimating the statistical and practical implications of an important set of choices generated by stakeholders. choices. This expanded the stakeholder process to include both basic discussions of value-added modeling and its potential uses, and more technical discussions of complex issues.
TEXAS POLICY CONTEXT

STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS AND CHOICES
Texas stakeholders were generally supportive of efforts to measure the performance of students of TPP graduates. However, there were serious concerns that information shared with the public be accurate, fair, and useful. For this study, we selected a subsample of the major issues raised by the stakeholder group. All are issues that will be confronted by any state attempting to develop a similar metric. Under the category of selection, we test the effects of stakeholder requests to exclude groups of teachers. Under the category of estimation, we test the importance of choices related to the inclusion of student, classroom, and campus covariates requested by stakeholders. Finally, we test the implications of these choices for interpretation of results for accountability, applying different classification criteria suggested by stakeholders. We recognize the importance and relevance of many other choices (see Osborne et al., 2012 for more inclusive list of stakeholder debates and discussions in Texas). The issues presented here are meant to illustrate a set of choices, and the implications of those choices, that will be increasingly relevant as more states implement test-based accountability for TPPs.
Under the category of selection, we test the implications of excluding two groups of new teachers: probationary teachers and teachers who are teaching outside of the area that their TPP trained them to teach. Probationary teachers are in their first year of teaching, but still undergoing training. Some stakeholders argued that attributing student outcomes for these partially-trained teachers to a TPP would be unfair. In Texas, teachers can receive a certification-by-exam in any area regardless of the training program they attended if they complete the required coursework. There were strong concerns that TPPs should not be accountable for teachers who chose the certificate-by-exam path to teach beyond the scope of their training.
Under the category of estimation, we test the implications of the selection of covariates in the estimation of TPP effects. This is perhaps the most controversial issue related to implementation of value-added measures in accountability systems (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, & Hamilton, 2003) . The simplest value-added model predicts TPP effects using only the student's prior test performance as a control for baseline performance. This estimation measures the average growth of students of TPP graduates compared to the average growth of all students.
However, typical growth rates are not the same for all groups of students. Value-added models that control for student demographics would estimate average TPP effects based on typical growth within a demographic subgroup. This could be sufficient if the distribution of student backgrounds was similar across TPPs. However, there is evidence from Texas and other states that student assignments are associated with a teacher's TPP (Osborne et al., 2012; Mihaly et al., 2012; Boyd et al., 2008) . This can occur if graduates of TPPs sort into campuses of different qualities (for example if graduates of a well-regarded TPP earn jobs in a wealthy district), and if principals sort new teachers into classrooms based on the TPP they attended (for example assigning a new teacher from a well-regarded TPP to a more challenging class). When this occurs, value-added estimates cannot separate TPP effects from correlated student, peer, campus, and neighborhood effects without control variables. Prior studies investigate the implications of adding control variables selected by researchers (Kane et al., 2013; McCaffrey et al, 2003; Baker et al, 2010) , and find that campus and classroom covariates are particularly important for removing bias.
Louisiana's TPP VAM researchers selected control variables based on a statistical procedure to identify significant covariates (Noell & Burns, 2006) . In Texas, relevant covariates were identified through the stakeholder process and review of available data. After reviewing academic evidence, the objective of the stakeholders was to identify variables that were beyond the control of TPPs and might influence the estimation of individual TPP effects through the teaching assignments of graduates. It was considered unfair to hold TPPs accountable for issues such as where teachers obtain jobs, how principals assign teachers to classrooms, and how schools and districts support (or fail to support) new teachers through professional development.
Stakeholders identified five constructs that could theoretically bias estimation of differences in TPP effects on student performance. Student demographics (race, gender, and socioeconomic status) relate to how students from different groups typically perform. Student experiences relate to whether a student has special needs or circumstances (such as pull-out special education or low attendance) that limit the teacher's influence on performance. Campus demographic and performance aggregates relate to the socio-economic status of the neighborhood and community and can indicate the level of social supports in the community.
Classroom aggregates relate to peer-effects on student performance. These four constructs are similar to theoretical influences discussed in prior literature (McCaffrey et al, 2003; Baker et al., 2010; Kane et al., 2013) . However, Texas stakeholders selected a more extensive set of variables to represent each construct in the value-added estimation. The fifth construct, campus climate, relates to the quality of school leadership and supports for new teachers. This construct is not tested in prior research on VAMs but reflects the strong preference of many stakeholders to avoid attributing to TPPs the effects of district policies, school leadership, or teacher supports.
Detailed variables lists for each construct are provided in Appendix B.
THE VALUE-ADDED MODEL
There are many strategies to estimate the effects of TPPs on student performance. To test the effects of specific stakeholder choices, it is necessary to hold other estimation choices constant with a single model. We test the effects of stakeholder decisions using a fixed-effects approach that resembles the models used in economic studies of TPP effects (for example Koedel et al., 2012; Mihaly, et al, 2012; Goldhaber & Liddle, 2009 where each student is assigned to the TPP that trained his teacher. By controlling for prior test performance, the estimation of the TPP effects reflects the contribution (or value-added) common to teachers from a TPP that pushes a student above or below her expected score based on past performance. To measure the effects of choices regarding selection of teachers on estimation, we use the base model to estimate value-added scores for four teacher samples proposed by stakeholders: 1) all new teachers, 2) excluding out-of-area teachers, 3) excluding probationary teachers, and 4) excluding both out-of-area and probationary teachers.
To estimate the effects of decisions regarding covariates, we incrementally add covariate groups until we reach a full specification with covariates for all five constructs. Comparison of value-added scores across estimations also requires that effects are measured in relation to the same reference point (Noell & Burns, 2006; Henry et al., 2012) . We measure TPP effects as the standardized distance from the grand-weighted mean of all TPP effects. 5 To avoid bias introduced when TPP effects are clustered within teachers, we estimate robust standard errors for clustering at the teacher level (Koedel et al., 2012) .
Our dataset, provided by TEA, includes all students in Texas public schools during the 2010-2011 school year. 6 Using these data, we linked each student to a math and reading teacher.
Data on teaching certificates and TPPs were merged through the SBEC database. Based on the Texas law, we identified new teachers as those in the first three years of teaching. The student dataset includes a comprehensive set of demographic variables, as well as the history of a student's enrollment, attendance, language and special education designations, and test performance in Texas public schools. Campus and classroom aggregates were constructed using data for all students in the group. Additional campus climate variables, such as geography and state accountability status, were merged from the state's public accountability system known as the Academic Excellence Indicators System (AEIS).
The nature of value-added estimation provides some limitations on how student performance can be used for accountability. It is not possible to include all grade levels in a VAM score. Each student must have at least one current test score and one prior observation of student performance. This eliminates all students in untested grades (pre K-2) and the first tested grade (grade 3). Although stakeholders were not comfortable with the exclusion of these untested grade levels from any measure of program quality, there is no data in Texas to calculate value-added in early grades.
5 A common alternative in value-added research is to compare TPPs to a common single omitted TPP. This approach is less useful in accountability setting, because one TPP needs be selected as the omitted group, and therefore would serve as the benchmark for TPP performance rather than receiving its own accountability measure. 6 Many studies of teacher and TPP value-added models recommend using multiple years of data to establish a stable estimate of a teacher or program effect. Texas only had one year of student-teacher linked data when the state mandated a TPP metric. Therefore, our results (and Texas's accountability system) are based on only a single year of data.
We hold constant a set of researcher-driven choices that facilitate identification of the effects of other choices. For example, it is problematic to link performance outcomes to the correct TPP if students have multiple teachers in a subject (Henry at al., 2012) . To minimize potential data problems while maintaining a consistent student sample, estimates in this study are based on self-contained classrooms. This maximizes the likelihood that the teacher of record is the teacher who contributed to student performance in both tested areas (reading and math) and therefore that outcomes are attributed to the correct TPP. Grades four and five are the only tested elementary grades in Texas with prior year tests, so all other grades are excluded. We also exclude students who have no prior test score and students who took the Modified, Alternate, or Spanish TAKS exams. 7 To create comparable scores across tests, TAKS scale scores are standardized within subject, grade, and year with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Data were available for 507,070 fourth and fifth graders assigned to 22,503 teachers. Of these, 83,184 students were taught by new teachers. The number of fourth and fifth grade math teachers associated with a TPP ranges from one to over 300. The number of students associated with a TPP ranges from one to over 8,900. The dataset used to estimate TPP VAMs excludes students with missing data and those not in self-contained classrooms, for a total of 81,667 student observations. Reported results are limited to 141 TPPs that have at least five teachers in the dataset. were assigned to students who were similar to the average for other new teachers. These differences in students taught by different types of teachers suggest that choices regarding teacher and covariates selection in value-added modeling can influence results, as teaching assignments do vary for teachers with different types of certificates.
STATISTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE-ADDED MODELING CHOICES
Research question #1 examines the statistical implications of the stakeholder concerns described above by estimating a VAM for each choice and examining the correlation of results across estimations. We present results here based on the 2011 math TAKS. 9 To test the effect of sample selection, we estimated EPP effects for four different samples of fourth and fifth grade students. The core analytic sample includes all students of new teachers. Assessing the reliability of TPP effects across teacher selection choices requires that the same sample of TPPs be used for all estimations. Some TPPs have only probationary or out-of-area teachers; thus, tests of reliability are estimated using a stable subsample of 126 TPPs that have five teachers in each subsample.
We define statistical reliability as, "consistency with which results occur" (Triola, 1997) .
For this study, we examine consistency of a TPP's estimated value-added score across samples 8 There are several ways that elementary school teachers could teach outside of their recommended area. For example, a teacher certificated for grades 6-8 can take on-line courses and test into a grade 4-8 certificate. Texas also has several elementary certificates that do not include grades 4-5. For example, a teacher originally certified for an early primary certificate (grades K-2) could test for a K-6 certificate without additional coursework. 9 Results for reading are often different than math for individual TPPs, but implications for reliability of estimates and stability of accountability classifications are similar.
and covariates. We calculate the Pearsons correlation coefficient of VAMs across different pairs of choices as a measure of this association. As a rule of thumb for interpretation, coefficients greater than 0.50 are moderately positive, coefficients greater than 0.70 are high positive, and coefficients greater than 0.90 are very high positive (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003) .
Pearson correlations (r statistics) of TPP value-added scores across the four samples for math are displayed in Table 2 . VAM results excluding out-of-area teachers have a very high association with results including all teachers (r=0.95). Results excluding probationary teachers have a weaker association, but correlations still meet the high positive standard (r=0.86). The weakest association is between the sample that excludes probationary teachers and the sample that excludes out-of-area teachers, but there is a high positive association (r=0.80). Overall, VAMs estimated with different samples are highly or very highly associated, but never perfectly associated (r=1.0). A VAM estimated from one sample is never perfectly predictive of a VAM estimated with an alternate sample.
Correlations across results estimated with different covariates are displayed in Table 3 .
VAMs estimated with different sets of covariates all have very high positive associations with each other (ranging from r=0.97 to r>0.99). Even with the addition of the stakeholders' highly inclusive full list of covariates, correlations with the base model still exceed the standard for a very high positive association. Table 4 illustrates the effect of changing both selection and covariate choices. Again, all correlations achieve the high positive or very high positive standard even when selection and covariate choices are changed simultaneously (ranging from r=0.84 to r>0.95).
This evidence suggests a high to very high level of statistical reliability among valueadded scores estimated with different teacher samples and covariates. Researchers would consider the TPP VAMs robust to the selection and estimation decision tested here, and in a research setting, we might conclude that stakeholder preferences were largely irrelevant to the estimation of the VAMs. We next examine if this conclusion is problematic in an accountability setting.
ACCOUNTABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE-ADDED MODELING CHOICES
Research question #2 addresses how stakeholder choices influence accountability determinations. Value-added scores are not easy to interpret. This is illustrated in Figure 1 For illustration here, we select a simple and plausible accountability structure that sorts TPPs into three groups -low, average, and high. Texas stakeholders were wary of any system (such as ranking or listing continuous values) that did not acknowledge the presence of estimation error in the value-added scores. There were particular concerns that statistically insignificant differences in scores would affect public perception or accreditation status. We test the influence of three decision rules for sorting that were proposed by stakeholders. All three compare individual scores to average performance (which we set at a value-added score of zero).
The first rule, most often applied in academic research, uses a 95 percent confidence interval.
Low TPPs are significantly below zero, average TPPs are statistically equal to zero, and high TPPs are significantly above zero. Some stakeholders supported a more rigid standard, as the 95 confidence interval is expected to misidentify five percent of TPPs. The second rule applies a more conservative 99 percent confidence interval.
The third strategy, which had the most support among stakeholders, grew from concerns that the number of TPP graduates would be too influential in a system based on statistical significance. For example, a large TPP might have a statistically significant score, even if the size of the effect was very small, while a small TPP might have a statistically insignificant score even if the effect size was large. Stakeholders preferred comparison to an absolute effect size indicative of a meaningful or "educationally significant" contribution to student performance. percent confidence decline to low-performing under educational significance, an indication of large, negative value-added scores that were not statistically different from zero. While the educational significance rule protects against identifying small effects as important, it is so conservative that it provides little insight to differentiate TPPs.
We next examine the implications of sample and estimation choices holding the criterion for interpretation constant. Table 6 shows the distribution of TPP status for the sample of all new teachers compared to alternative samples. We apply the 95 percent confidence rule to classify program effects. In addition to programs that change status, changing the teacher sample also excludes some TPPs from analysis if they do not have five teachers left in the sample.
Importantly, these programs would have no accountability classification. Excluding out-of-area teachers results in three programs (2 percent) dropping from classification. Nine programs (6 percent) remain in the estimation but change classification. Contrary to the assumption that including out-of-area teachers would harm TPPs, five programs improve and four decline.
Excluding probationary teachers has more profound effect with 11 programs (8 percent)
excluded, and 13 programs (9 percent) changing classification. Interestingly, the exclusion of probationary teachers, who have received the least training, is not always beneficial. Of the 13 programs that change classification, five improve, and eight decline. Excluding both probationary and out-of-area teachers compounds this instability in interpretation of results.
Fifteen programs (11 percent) are excluded, and 17 programs change classification (12 percent).
Thus, despite high statistical correlations, the choice of teacher sample can influence up to one in five TPPs with either a reclassification or exclusion from classification. Table 7 illustrates the instability of classifications across estimations with different covariates. We begin (on the vertical axis) with a base model that controls for prior test score, student demographics, and teacher experience. We then incrementally add covariate groups. All estimates in Table 7 include the same sample of all new teachers, so no TPPs are excluded. Each covariate addition results in at least six changes in classification. As predicted by prior research, campus-level variables induce the greatest number of changes. Eight programs (6 percent) change classification with the addition of campus aggregates, and twelve programs (9 percent) change status with the addition of campus climate. It is notable that classification is most sensitive to the group of covariates selected to reflect campus climate, a category of variables that has not been included in prior academic studies of TPP effects.
As a final illustration of the implications of estimation strategies, Figure 3 Tables 6 and 7 are due to small (or sometimes no) changes in estimated value-added scores. The decision rule of educational significance provides the most stable results, because it depends only on effect size and not statistical significance.
It is important to note that all the results here are based on some simplifications to facilitate comparisons. In a practical setting, we would not limit estimation to fourth and fifth grade self-contained classes, and VAMs for multiple subjects would be estimated. It is likely that both the statistical and practical implications of stakeholder choices would be compounded in a comprehensive evaluation system that included all grade levels and subjects.
DISCUSSION
In a pure research setting, issues of sample selection and covariates would be settled through theory development and testing. In an accountability setting, these issues must be addressed with consideration of stakeholder preferences and policy goals. While a national agenda moves toward requiring test-based accountability for TPPs, the process of developing a test-based metric in Texas illustrates that stakeholders have strong preferences about how TPP effects are calculated, and the policy implications of these choices are profound. Meanwhile, the Florida value-added accountability system, in which design elements were selected by legislative mandate instead of through stakeholder input, is facing stakeholder lawsuits questioning the measure's validity (O'Connor, 2013) . This study illustrates that stakeholders have profound and reasonable concerns about value-added modeling in a research setting and its application to accountability. We also illustrate how accountability classifications for individual programs can depend on decisions made in the process. Although not tested here, it is likely that other issues such as data quality and test characteristics are also influential in value-added results. The growing emphasis on including value-added measures in educational accountability requires that statistical expertise and political processes be connected so that (1) stakeholders can understand value-added measures and participate in their development, and (2) experts are sensitized to the policy implications of data limitations and analytic strategies.
From a research standpoint, the decisions discussed here may seem trivial. TPP effects are statistically reliable across samples and estimations. From a policy and accountability standpoint, however, each change to the base model and teacher sample resulted in reclassification of at least one TPP, with some decisions changing the status of up to 20 percent of programs. These results are supported by other academic studies that illustrate problems with the precision of VAMs (Koedel et al, 2012; Mihaly et al, 2012) . Although other states have not published results based on alternative empirical choices, it is likely that results, and accountability consequences, would vary there as well. By combining the empirical approach of academic studies and the context of accountability in Texas, this study provides evidence that problems in estimation of VAMs can lead to different practical interpretations with potentially high-stakes consequences.
Our analysis also highlights the ambiguity of value-added metrics in accountability systems without clear criteria to identify success and failure. Policymakers often expect valueadded measures to tell us which programs, schools, or teachers are good or bad. They also assume that value-added results provide useful feedback to programs. In practice, value-added scores create a highly aggregated measure that can be interpreted in different ways. The number of TPPs identified as low-performing in our estimations varies from a high of 17, based on a 95 percent confidence interval, to a low of four, based on our stakeholder definition of educational significance. More importantly, different TPPs are identified based on different criteria. The sensitivity of accountability status to sampling and modeling also depends on the rigor of the criteria for identifying negative effects. States will need to grapple with the difficult trade-off between the risk of misidentifying a TPP (which will occur five percent of the time with a 95 percent confidence rule), and the lack of information provided by an accountability system that identifies almost all programs as average. Reliance on VAMs to determine program quality also limits the scope of evaluation, No information is provided for programs that specialize in untested grades (typically early elementary and upper high school grades) or untested subjects (such as fine arts or vocational courses), and no information is provided about which specific training methods and strategies are most effective.
States implementing value-added measures will also need to consider the stakes attached to accountability. Hill (2009) Estimates control for prior test score, student demographics, and teacher experience. Includes 126 TPPs with at least five teachers in each sample. All correlations are significant at p<0.001. 95% confidence criteria identifies programs as high-performing/low-performing if the estimated TPP effect is significantly greater/less than zero with 95% confidence (p<0.05).
99% confidence criteria identifies programs as high-performing/low-performing if the estimated TPP effect is significantly greater/less than zero with 99% confidence (p<0.01).
Education significance criteria identifies programs as high-performing/low-performing if the estimated TPP effect is greater/less than 0.25 standard deviations from the mean. Identifies programs as high-performing/low-performing if the estimated TPP effect is significantly greater/less than zero with 95% confidence (p<0.05). Identifies programs as high-performing/low-performing if the estimated TPP effect is significantly greater/less than zero with 95% confidence (p<0.05). Base model includes controls for prior test score, student demographics, and teacher experience. Sample includes all new teachers. Results are displayed for TPPs that have at least one statistically significant VAM score at 95% confidence level. 
